@Hyolobrika @AltonDooley @volkris No. Quite the contrary. The President is given absolute immunity for "conclusive and preclusive" "official acts" including "commanding the Armed Forces of the United States; granting reprieves and pardons", and "at least presumptive immunity" for all other official acts. The majority explicitly states that "Nor may courts deem an action unofficial merely because it allegedly violates a generally applicable law." 1/
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(1) When the President acts pursuant to “constitutional and stat- utory authority,” he takes official action to perform the functions of his office. Fitzgerald, 456 U. S., at 757. Determining whether an action is covered by immunity thus begins with assessing the President’s au- thority to take that action. But the breadth of the President’s “discre- tionary responsibilities” under the Constitution and laws of the United States frequently makes it “difficult to determine which of [his] innu- merable ‘functions’ encompassed a particular action.” Id., at 756. The immunity the Court has recognized therefore extends to the “outer pe- rimeter” of the President’s official responsibilities, covering actions so long as they are “not manifestly or palpably beyond [his] authority.” Blassingame v. Trump, 87 F. 4th 1, 13 (CADC).
In dividing official from unofficial conduct, courts may not inquire into the President’s motives. Such a “highly intrusive” inquiry would risk exposing even the most obvious instances of official conduct to ju- dicial examination on the mere allegation of improper purpose. Fitz- gerald, 457 U. S., at 756. Nor may courts deem an action unofficial merely because it allegedly violates a generally applicable law. Oth- erwise, Presidents would be subject to trial on “every allegation that an action was unlawful,” depriving immunity of its intended effect.](media_attachments/files/112/738/353/619/464/492/original/746a6ebf41fad1a3.png)
Text: (1) When the President acts pursuant to “constitutional and stat- utory authority,” he takes official action to perform the functions of his office. Fitzgerald, 456 U. S., at 757. Determining whether an action is covered by immunity thus begins with assessing the President’s au- thority to take that action. But the breadth of the President’s “discre- tionary responsibilities” under the Constitution and laws of the United States frequently makes it “difficult to determine which of [his] innu- merable ‘functions’ encompassed a particular action.” Id., at 756. The immunity the Court has recognized therefore extends to the “outer pe- rimeter” of the President’s official responsibilities, covering actions so long as they are “not manifestly or palpably beyond [his] authority.” Blassingame v. Trump, 87 F. 4th 1, 13 (CADC). In dividing official from unofficial conduct, courts may not inquire into the President’s motives. Such a “highly intrusive” inquiry would risk exposing even the most obvious instances of official conduct to ju- dicial examination on the mere allegation of improper purpose. Fitz- gerald, 457 U. S., at 756. Nor may courts deem an action unofficial merely because it allegedly violates a generally applicable law. Oth- erwise, Presidents would be subject to trial on “every allegation that an action was unlawful,” depriving immunity of its intended effect.